Will California's "One Strike" Law
Stop Sexual Predators, or Is a Civil
Commitment System Needed?
This Comment urges California* and other jurisdictions to
enact sexual predator laws to civilly commit dangerous, mentally ill
sex offenders who are nearing release from prison and are a
credible threat to re-offend. Such statutes, though, are appropriate
and constitutional only when they are narrowly tailored to achieve
this goal. A Model Sexual Predators Act included in the Appendix
surmounts substantive and procedural due process concerns,
increases the safety of the public, and safeguards the accused
individuals interest in liberty.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1987, the ten-year prison sentence of convicted child molester Earl
Shriner was nearing completion in the State of Washington. As his
release date neared, prison officials sought to keep Shriner behind bars
because they discovered letters and drawings that expressed his desire to
molest and kill children by using a mobile torture chamber. 1 However,
Shriner did not meet Washington State's existing mental health civil

* Editor's Note: After this Comment was written, the California Legislature
passed a sexual predator commitment law. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 6600-08
(West Supp. 1996). However, according to the author of this Comment, California's
sexual predator law is very similar to Washington's law, which was recently declared
unconstitutional by a federal district court. See Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744
(W.D. Wash. 1995) (holding that the law violated the Due Process, Ex Post Facto, and
Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Constitution). Because California bases its approach on
what is believed to be an unconstitutional civil commitment scheme, the author urges the
California Legislature to adopt a substantively fairer approach such as that suggested by
the Model Sexual Predators Act in the Appendix of this Comment.
1. Kate Shatzkin, Lack ofRemorse Key in Sentence for Shriner, Exceptional 131Year Term Given/or Mutilationo/Tacoma Boy, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 27, 1990, at Cl.
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commitment statute2 because he had not committed a "recent overt
act"3 and was not mentally ill according to psychiatrists. Shriner was
released from prison and two years later4 acted on his intentions. He
lured a young Tacoma boy into the nearby woods, raped him repeatedly,
stabbed him in the back, cut his penis off with a knife, and left the boy
for dead after choking him. Despite this brutal attack, the boy survived
and identified Shriner as his assailant. 5 Following this incident, a wave
of public outcry compelled the Washington State Legislature to take
action. 6 The result was Washington's Sexually Violent Predators (SVP)
law, which permits civil commitment7 of violent sex offenders after the
offender's prison term has been served. 8
When twelve-year-old Polly Klaas disappeared from her home in
Northern California on October 1, 1993, the limitations of the criminal
justice system were again exposed. Two months after she vanished,
parolee Richard Allen Davis9 was arrested and led authorities to Klaas's
body. 10 Davis had allegedly kidnapped Klaas from a slumber party at

2. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
3. See In re Harris, 654 P.2d 109, 113 (Wash. 1982). Shriner was locked up in
prison for 10 years, thereby making a recent overt act a virtual impossibility. For further
discussion on overt act requirements, see infra text accompanying notes 146-52.
4. During these two years, Shriner had additional problems with the law. Three
months after his 1987 release, Shriner was given a 90-day sentence for stabbing a 16year-old boy in the arm. Then, a year later, he grabbed a boy behind a store, unbuttoned
the boy's pants, tied him to a fence post, and beat the boy with his fists. That crime
earned him a 67-day jail sentence. Sally MacDonald & Jim Simon, Suspect Fell
Through the Cracks of the System, SEATILE TIMES, May 24, 1989, at A7.
5. Id
6. Gary Gleb, Comment, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: The Need
to Bar Unreliable Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness from Civil Commitment
Proceedings, 39 UCLA L. REV. 213, 214 (1991) (citing Barry Siegal, Locking Up
"Sexual Predators," L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1990, at Al, A30).
7. Civil commitment rather than criminal incarceration is used for those
individuals, such as insanity acquittees or the mentally ill, who are in need of treatment
and are a danger to society. Unlike criminal prosecution and incarceration, which are
based on deterrence and retribution, civil commitment, although usually indefinite in
duration, must end when the individual is either no longer dangerous to society or is no
longer mentally ill. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77-78 (1992). The
SVP law allows the state to use the civil system rather than the criminal justice system
to indefinitely remove a sexual predator from society.
8. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
9. Davis had been previously convicted of burglary, attempted sexual assault on
a woman at knife-point, assaulting a woman with a fireplace poker, escaping from a
mental hospital, and forcing his way into a woman's apartment and compelling her at
gun-point to give him money. He was released from prison in June of 1993 after serving
his sentence for the most recent of these offenses. On October 1, 1993, less then four
months after Davis's release, Polly Klaas was kidnapped and killed. Debra J. Saunders,
What Price Justice/or Polly?, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 30, 1994, at A27.
10. Ron Sonenshine, Polly Klaas Slaying Suspect to Stand Trial, Richard Allen
Davis Could Be Sentenced to Death, S.F. CHRON., May 14, 1994, at Al.
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her home, sexually assaulted her, strangled her to death, and then buried
her in a shallow grave. 11 The public was outraged to learn that the
alleged killer was a parolee who had prior sex-related convictions.
California lawmakers scrambled to push through legislation, as
constituents statewide demanded tougher laws to protect society from
repeat offenders, especially violent sex offenders. 12 Within a year,
California had passed the "one strike" law, which mandates a minimum
sentence of either fifteen or twenty-five years to life for violent sex
offenders. 13
The public's reaction to these two horrifying stories spurred the
respective state legislatures to attempt different solutions to the problem
of repeat violent sex offenders who slip through the cracks of the
criminal justice system. Washington's SVP statute and California's "one
strike" law are examined in Section II of this Comment. Washington's
law seeks to prevent new offenses from occurring by committing the
"predator" before another offense can be perpetrated. On the other hand,
California's law severely stiffens prison sentences for those convicted of
newly committed sex offenses. Although California's "one strike" law
promises to keep future offenders off the streets for substantially longer
periods of time, the "one strike" law cannot effectively protect its
citizenry from violent sex offenders who are nearing release from prison,
yet remain credible threats to re-offend. Therefore, this Comment argues
that California should adopt a modified version of Washington's SVP
law to fill in the dangerous void left by the "one strike" law.

11. Dan Reed & Ron Sonenshine, 8 Charges In Polly Case-SuspectFaces Death
Penalty, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 8, 1993, at Al. Four of the counts against Davis alleged that
he tied and gagged two of Klaas' friends who witnessed the abduction and threatened
them with a knife. Id. One hour after the kidnapping had occurred, two sheriff's
deputies apparently talked with Davis about the fact that his car was in a ditch next to
a main road. After helping Davis get his car out of the ditch, the deputies left. Later
in the investigation, law enforcement agents discovered strips of cloth, Klaas' s tights, and
a sweatshirt only 60 feet from where the officers had questioned Davis. Discovery of
an unrolled condom with the clothing near the ditch, id., as well as the fact that Klaas' s
body was found with her skirt pushed above her waist and her shirt open, led prosecutors
to charge Davis with sexually assaulting the girl. Sonenshine, supra note 10.
12. See Ken Chavez, Wilson Claims Victory on Dozen Crime Bills, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Sept. 2, 1994, at A3.
13. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. 14 (West) (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 667.61,
667.71, 1203.066 (West Supp. 1995)).
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The constitutional problems facing Washington's SVP scheme 14 are
discussed in Section III of this Comment. That section focuses on In re
Young, 15 the first Washington Supreme Court decision to consider
constitutional challenges to the SVP law. Section III will analyze the
Young court's decision regarding the issue of whether the SVP law is
civil or punitive in nature, as well as the substantive and procedural due
process challenges raised by the petitioners. 16
The Appendix to this Comment consists of a model statute that was
drafted by the author. The model statute incorporates portions of
established "sexual predator" statutes from various jurisdictions as well
as innovations created by the author. 17 Accompanying each section of
the model statute is commentary describing the origins of that particular
section and the reasons for the modifications or innovations contained
therein. This model statute, the Model Sexual Predators Act (MSPA),
was carefully drawn to be more narrow in scope than Washington's
commitment statute. The MSPA overcomes the potential constitutional
shortcomings of the SVP law by requiring a psychiatrically recognized
mental illness rather than the SVP's legislatively created and defined
"mental abnormality." The MSPA also strikes a better balance between
society's legitimate need for protection and the moral and constitutional
rights to which an accused individual is entitled. Although the Due
Process Clause, as interpreted by the current United States Supreme
Court, is unlikely to require an increased number or quality of individual
protections in future sexual predator statutes, 18 fairness and morality
mandate this development. 19 The MSPA meets these goals and also
includes a unique section that mandates the classification of accused
predators by degree of dangerousness and severity of mental illness, 20
thereby enabling jurists to choose meaningful alternatives to indefinite
commitment. 21

14. This Comment will not address the presumed constitutionality of California's
sentence-enhancing "one strike" law because the focus of this Comment is on civil
commitment schemes for sexual predators, not sentence-enhancing laws.
15. 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993).
16. For the discussion of these issues, see infra Section III.
17. See Appendix, infra.
18. For a discussion of the procedural due process arguments, see infra text
accompanying notes 122-57.
19. Compare Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality and Morality of Civilly
Committing Violent Sexual Predators, 15 U. PuGET SOUND L. REV. 709, 753-54 (1992),
with John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Statute: Law or
Lottery? A Response to Professor Brooks, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 755, 778 (1992).
20. See infra Appendix, MSPA § 2(3)-(4).
21. See infra Appendix, MSPA § 5.2.
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IL
A.

THE

STATUTES

California's "One Strike" Law

California's Governor, Pete Wilson, signed into law a number of anticrime bills, including the "one strike" law, in September of 1994.22
The "one strike" law increased the length of the prison terms to which
sex offenders will be sentenced by adding a new section to the
California Penal Code and amending two other sections. 23 Specifically,
the "one strike" law mandates that a person convicted of a sex offense
listed in Penal Code section 667.61(c)24 will be sentenced under certain
circumstances to life in prison without the possibility of parole for
twenty-five years. 25 A person convicted of a sex offense under other

22. See Chavez, supra note 12. In addition to the enactment of Senate Bill 26,
commonly referred to as the "one strike" law, other like-minded legislation was signed
into law: 1993-94 Cal. Legis. Serv. 447 (West) (any person convicted of felony
violation of specified sex offenses shall be punished by additional consecutive term of
25 years to life); 1993-94 Cal. Legis. Serv. 446 (West) (punishes habitual sex offender
with 25-year-to-life sentences and prohibits parole for at least 25 years); 1993-94 Cal.
Legis. Serv. 878 (West) (provides that specified sex offenses against a child under 14
years of age shall be punished by a 15-year-to-life prison term); 1993-94 Cal. Legis.
Serv. 18 (West) (increases the sentences of felony sex offenders who kidnap their
victims).
23. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. 14 (West) (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667.61,
667.71, 1203.066 (West Supp. 1995)).
24. Section 667.61(c) applies to any of the following offenses: (I) Rape by force
or fear (CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(2)); (2) Rape of a person unable to give consent
(CAL. PENAL CODE § 262(a)(3)); (3) Aiding or abetting rape (CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 264.1 ); (4) Lewd or lascivious acts, by means of force or fear, with a child under 14
years ofage (CAL. PENAL CODE§ 288(b); (5) Penetration by foreign object (CAL. PENAL
CODE§ 289); (6) Sodomy (CAL. PENAL CODE§ 286) or oral copulation (CAL. PENAL
CODE § 288a) by force or fear; and (7) Lewd and lascivious acts with a child under 14
years ofage (CAL. PENAL CODE § 288( a)), unless defendant qualifies for probation under
CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1203.066(c) (see infra note 35). CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667.61(c)
(West Supp. 1995).
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.61(a) (West Supp. 1995). Section 667.61(a) states
that a person who is convicted of an offense specified in subd. (c) under one or more of
the circumstances specified in subd. (d) or under two or more of the circumstances
specified in subd. (e) shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall not be eligible for
parole for 25 years. Id Section 667 .61 ( d) includes any of the following enumerated
circumstances: (I) Prior conviction of offenses specified in subd. (c), including those
in other jurisdictions with elements equivalent to subd. (c) offenses; (2) Kidnapping that
substantially increased the risk of harm above the risk level inherent in the underlying
offense specified in subd. (c); (3) Aggravated mayhem (CAL. PENAL CODE§ 205) or
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circumstances will be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility
of parole for fifteen years. 26 If there are multiple victims, the law
mandates that the offender receive a separate prison term for each
victim. 27 The law further denies the convicted offender the possibility
of probation or the suspension of his or her sentence if the offense is one
of the first six offenses enumerated in Penal Code section 667.61(c). 28
Habitual sex offenders29 that are sentenced under the "one strike" law
also receive a sentence of twenty-five years to life. 3° For first-time sex
offenders and habitual sex offenders alike, the opportunity for parole is
expressly prohibited until the offender has served at least eighty-five
percent of the minimum prison term. 31

torture (CAL. PENAL CODE § 206); (4) Commission of the offense during a burglary
(CAL. PENAL CODE § 460(a)) with the intent to commit an offense specified in
§ 667.67(c). CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6l(d) (West Supp. 1995). Section 667.6l(e)
includes any of the following enumerated circumstances: (1) Except as provided in
§ 667.6l(d)(2), kidnapping (CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 207,208,209, or 209.5); (2) Except
as provided in § 667.61 (d)( 4), commission of the offense during a burglary (CAL. PENAL
CODE§ 460(a)) or burglary of a building, including a commercial establishmentthat was
closed to the public (CAL. PENAL CODE § 459); (3) Personal infliction of great bodily
injury during the commission of an offense (CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022. 7-.8); (4) Use
of a dangerous or deadly weapon in the commission of an offense (CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 12022, 12022.3, or 12022.5); (5) In the present case or cases, conviction of a subd.
(c) offense against more than one victim; (6) Tying or binding the victim or another in
the commission of the offense; (7) Administering a controlled substance to the victim
by force, violence, or fear in the commission of the offense (CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 12022.75). CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6l(e) (West Supp. 1995).
26. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667.6l(b) (West Supp. 1995). The section states that a
person who is convicted of an offense specified in subd. (c) under one of the
circumstances specified in subd. (e) shall be sentenced to life in prison and shall not be
eligible for parole for 15 years. Id
27. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6l(g) (West Supp. 1995).
28. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667.6l(h) (West Supp. 1995). See supra note 24 for the
enumerated offenses.
29. Defined by statute as "a person who has been previously convicted of one or
more of the offenses listed in subdivision (d) [of§ 667.71] and who is convicted in the
present proceeding of one of those offenses." CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667.71(a) (West
Supp. 1995). Section 667.71(d) expands the number of offenses that trigger thehabitual
sex offender section. This section also includes other jurisdictions' convictions that meet
the elements of one of the specified offenses. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667. 71 (d) (West
Supp. 1995).
30. However intriguing the plight of the overcrowded prison system may be, this
Comment will not focus on the inevitable budgetary and other problems associated with
implementing the "one strike" law or other sentence enhancement laws. For a discussion
of these issues, see Saunders, supra note 9; Editorial, On Mandatory Sentences. . . 'One
Strike' Will Backfire L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 12, 1994, at 6.
31
Credit reduction of prison terms does apply to reduce the minimum terms under
the "one strike" law. However, § 667.610) prohibits the article's application beyond
15% of the minimum term and dictates that parole is not possible until 85% of minimum
term has been served. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.61(j) (West. Supp. 1995). Section
667.71(b) has the identical prohibitions regarding credit reduction for habitual sex
offenders' minimum 25-year term. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667.71(b) (West. Supp. 1995).
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One of the earlier drafts of the "one strike" legislation called for life
sentences without the possibility of parole for all sex crimes, including
so-called "acquaintance rape" cases and cases involving family
members. 32 However, women's groups and some prosecutors opposed
this tough stance. Victims, especially children, they argued, would be
hesitant to testify against a loved one if a conviction would automatically
lead to a life sentence without the possibility of parole. 33 Since the
early stages, the "one strike" legislation has been amended numerous
times to factor into account similar considerations. 34 Accordingly, to
avoid the inequitably harsh result of either no conviction or life
imprisonment, the "one strike" law presently permits the courts to punish
some sex offenders, in severely limited situations, with sentences as
lenient as probation. 35

32. Ken Chavez, 'One Strike' Bill Amended to Satisfy Critics, SACRAMENTO BEE,
May 7, 1994, at A3.
33. Id.
34. Senate Bill 26, introduced by Senator Bergeson on Feb. 2, 1994, was amended
four times before the final version was enacted. The original bill only called for
enhancing existing sex offender sentences to 6, 12, or 16 years. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv.
14 (West) (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667.61, 667.71, 1203.066).
35. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1203.066(WestSupp.1995). Subsection(c) allows lesser
penalties if the court finds that:
(1) The defendant is the victim's natural parent, adoptive parent, stepparent,
relative, or is a member of the victim's household who has lived in the
household.
(2) A grant of probation to the defendant is in the best interest of the child.
(3) Rehabilitation of the defendant is feasible ... and the defendant is
placed in a recognized treatment program designed to deal with child
molestation immediately after the grant of probation or the suspension of
execution or imposition of sentence.
(4) The defendant is removed from the household of the victim until the
court determines that the best interests of the victim would be served by
returning the defendant to the household of the victim.
(5) There is no threat of physical harm to the child victim if probation is
granted. The court upon making its findings pursuant to this subdivision is not
precluded from sentencing the defendant to jail or prison, but retains the
discretion not to do so.
Id Subsection (c) also requires that the court appoint a psychiatrist or psychologist to
make a report regarding paragraphs (2), (3), and (4). Id
For more detailed comments on psychiatry and sex offenders, see Robert M. Wettstein,
M.D., A PsychiatricPerspectiveon Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Statute, 15
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 597 (1992), and see also Gleb, supra note 6.
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The purpose of the "one strike" law is to effectively remove both firsttime and habitual sex offenders from the streets. 36 Under the statute,
courts are compelled to dole out prison sentences of unprecedented
length for sex offense convictions. Once imprisoned under the "one
strike" scheme, convicted offenders may be monitored by parole boards
for signs of future dangerousness to ensure that high-risk parole
candidates are not released. 37 Although the "one strike" law promises
to be successful at enhancing punishment and enabling consideration of
dangerousness before parole, it is not currently capable ofresponding "to
the long-existing but previously unsolved problem of what to do about
sex offenders whose prison terms are [presently] expiring, yet who are
regarded as still extremely dangerous." 38 The "one strike" law is silent
with respect to those habitual sex offenders awaiting release from prison
who have expressed a credible desire to harm others again. Although
the days of lenient sentencing may have passed, 39 many dangerous
offenders who were given light sentences in the past are now being
released into a society that is screaming for protection after the Polly
Klaas and Earl Shriner tragedies. 40 The "one strike" law is likely to be
an effective means to lock up dangerous sex criminals after they have
been caught again, but the law is powerless to stop already known sex
offenders from stepping out of their prison cells and preying on new
victims.

B.

Washington 's Sexually Violent Predators Act

In 1990, the Washington Legislature made a bold move away from the
modem trend of abolishing statutes that call for the civil commitment of
sex offenders41 by enacting the Sexually Violent Predators Act. 42 The

36. Chavez, supra note 32.
37. Subsections (a) and (b) of§ 667.61 mandate a life term upon conviction with
parole eligibility beginning in either 25 or 15 years, respectively. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 667.61 (a)-(b)(West Supp. 1995). Under this scheme, the court will sentence offenders
to life terms and the parole boards will then have the authority to parole the offenders
only when and if they are safe for release. If implemented in this fashion, the "one
strike" law could effectively impact the number of violent repeat offenders in society by
keeping them in jail ad infinitum.
38. Brooks, supra note 19, at 710.
39. Nearly Half of Sex Offenders Avoid Prison, Paper Says, SACRAMENTO BEE,
May 31, 1994, at BS. "Nearly half of the sex offenders in California don't go to prison,
and those who do serve time are released in an average [of] 3-1/2 years because of jail
overcrowding ...." Id The article cites its source as a 1992 California Department
of Justice analysis of 1992 sex crime data.
40. See supra text accompanying notes 1-13.
41. See, e.g., Gleb, supra note 6, at 215. Concern about civil rights and claims of
ineffective treatment for sex offenders have been the principal motivation for repealing
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SVP law permits indefinite confinement of sexually violent predators
who do not necessarily have a psychiatrically recognized mental disease
or defect. To qualify as a sexual predator under the statute, the sex
offender must have been previously convicted of a crime of sexual
violence and suffer from a "mental abnormality" or "personality
disorder"43 that makes him or her likely to engage in predatory acts of
sexual violence. 44 Washington's legislature considered the state's
existing commitment statute for the mentally ill45 inappropriate for

sex offender civil commitment schemes. By 1990, only 13 states still had these schemes,
compared to 26 states in 1960. Id California repealed its sex offender commitment
scheme in 1981. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§§ 6300-31 (repealed 1981). During
this period, many jurisdictions repealed their schemes because of the
[g]rowing awareness that there is no specific group of individuals who can be
labeled sexual psychopaths by acceptable medical standards and that there are
no proven treatments for such offenders .... [P]rofessional groups [such] as
the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, the President's Commission on
Mental Health, and most recently, the American Bar Association Committee
on Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards ... urge that these [sexual
psychopath] laws be repealed.
Beth K. Fujimoto, Comment, Sexual Violence, Sanity, and Safety: Constitutional
Parameters/or Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REv. 879, 904 (1992) ( citing SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND
THE LAW 740, 743 (3d ed. 1985)).
Led by Washington's initiative, state legislatures in Wisconsin, Kansas, Iowa, and
Minnesota have recently enacted sexual predator statutes similar to the SVP law. Also,
10 other states are considering such legislation. See Erin Gunn, Comment, Washington's
Sexually Violent Predator Law: The 'Predatory' Requirement, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J.
277, 279-80 n.13 (1994).
42. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
43. The Washington Legislature has defined the term "personality disorder" as a
disorder recognized by psychiatric medicine. The term "mental abnormality" has been
legislatively defined as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or
volitional capacity which predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual
acts in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others."
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 71.09.020(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). The term "mental
abnormality" is not a psychiatric term. For a discussion of the problems caused by the
Washington Legislature's definition of that term, see infra notes 103-21 and the
accompanying text.
44. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). Note: the
sex offender need not be imprisoned for a petition to be filed for civil commitment. For
example, Vance Cunningham was a free man when he was convicted of being a sexual
predator and indefinitely committed. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 995 (Wash. 1993).
45. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
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civilly committing sexual predators because that statute requires a more
specific and higher level of mental disease or defect. 46
Washington's sexual predator commitment scheme is designed to
operate in the following manner. As the prison release date of each sex
offender approaches, the Department of Corrections staff performs a
screening procedure to determine which offenders should still be
considered dangerous to the public. The End of Sentence Review
Referral Subcommittee (ESRRS)47 and the Indeterminate Sentence
Review Board (ISRB)48 then further narrow this group of potential
sexual predators by determining which offenders present a high risk of
committing future sex offenses. This is the group that is brought to the
attention of prosecuting attorneys and the Attorney General. 49 In order
to make this determination, the ESRRS and the ISRB examine the
offender's record of prior arrests and convictions for sexually violent
crimes, overall criminal history, records of prior mental evaluations
and/or treatments, 50 current mental health evaluations, pre-sentence and
end-of-sentence review reports, the offender's version of his offenses,
records of any interviews, and institutional records describing the
offender's behavior while in custody. 51 After receiving an ESRRS
referral, the prosecuting attorney then reviews the case and has the
authority to file a personal restraint petition with the court to seek civil
commitment of the offender. 52 In cases where the alleged predator has

46. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). The
statute for committing the mentally ill is not well suited to committing sexual predators
because its aim is directed towards individuals with "serious mental disorders" that only
need short-term treatment before being returned to society. Id. Furthermore, the mental
illness commitment statute requires an overt act. Legislators wanted to avoid the overt
act requirement because imprisoned sexual predators have no opportunity to perform an
overt act and, therefore, could not be committed under the existing statute. See id.
47. The ESRRS is composed of members from the Departments of Corrections and
Social and Health Services. Brooks, supra note 19, at 714 (citing DIVISION OF PRISONS,
WASHINGTON DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, DIVISION DIRECTIVE REFERRING SELECT
OFFENDERS TO THE END OF SENTENCE REVIEW COMMITTEE (ESRC) (May 28, 1991)).
48. Formerly the Parole Board. Id.
49. Id.
50. Including psychological or psychiatric testing, group notes, autobiographical
notes, progress notes, psycho-social reports, and other material gathered while the
offender was in custody. Id. (citing letter from Jeanne Tweten, Assistant Attorney
General, State of Washington, Criminal Division, to Professor Alex Brooks, Rutgers Law
School (Apr. 7, 1992) (containing final draft of Washington Attorney General's
"Sexually Violent Predator Filing Standards") (on file with the University of Puget
Sound Law Review)).
51. Id. at 715.
52. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.030 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). The law
defines a sexually violent predator as any person who suffers from a personality disorder
that makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence and is
convicted or charged with a violent sex crime against a stranger (such as first degree
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already been released from prison, the onus lies solely with the
prosecuting authority to initiate an investigation and file a petition with
the court seeking commitment. 53 Although the SVP law itself does not
require any showing of recidivism, the Washington State Attorney
General requires that the offender exhibit a pattern of predatory acts
before a prosecutor may file a petition under the statute. If the court
decides that probable cause exists for the charge, the alleged predator is
moved to a special maximum security facility, which is operated by the
Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS), for further evaluation
and preparation for trial. 54
Unlike an ordinary civil trial, the prosecution carries the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt, not by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the person before the court is a sexually violent predator.55 The Washington legislation assures that the alleged predator is
afforded the right to a jury trial within forty-five days after the filing of
the petition, the right to have legal counsel appointed, and the assistance
of mental health professionals for evaluation and expert testimony. 56
If convicted, the predator is indefinitely committed to the DSHS
facility. 57 Washington law then requires the DSHS staff to develop an

rape, second degree rape by forcible compulsion, or indecent liberties against a child
under age 14). WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 71.09.020 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
53. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 71.09.030 (West 1992& Supp. 1995). Ifthecourt
finds probable cause for the petition, an arrest warrant is issued and the alleged predator
is apprehended and taken to a Department of Social and Health Services facility. See
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.040 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
54. Brooks, supra note 19, at 715. Among other things, the Attorney General's
filing standards also require a mental health professional to find a "mental abnormality
or personality disorder" that makes the offender more likely to commit sexually violent
acts. Id. For a discussion of the problems created by the Washington Legislature's
definition of "mental abnormality," see infra notes 103-21 and accompanying text.
55. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(1) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
56. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.050 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
57. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). Once a
person is committed as a sexual predator, the predator is given an annual examination
to determine mental condition. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.070 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1995). The predator also has an annual right to petition for a hearing. The court
first determines whether to deny the hearing or whether there is probable cause to believe
that the predator's condition has changed enough to warrant another trial. WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 71.09.100 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). At trial, the prosecution again
bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the "person's mental
abnormality or personality disorder remains such that the person is not safe to be at large
and if released will engage in acts of sexual violence." WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 71.09.090(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). If the prosecution bears its burden, the
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individualized treatment plan for the committed predator 58 and to
provide the predator with a number of rights and privileges not usually
associated with maximum-security prison facilities. 59
The Washington Legislature's intent is unequivocal: keep sexual
predators away from society, regardless of whether they have already
served their so-called "debt to society." The means to achieve this goal
is a system of indefinite civil commitment and treatment, which the SVP
statute itself admits is doubtful to produce any cure or effective
treatment for these sex offenders. 60 The standards and procedures
established by the varied legislation that constitutes the SVP law are
essential to keep truly dangerous individuals out of mainstream society.
Although "[o]pponents' fears of a civil commitment drift-net cast by
overzealous prosecutors over the prison population to catch hundreds of
sex offenders" have not materialized, 61 Washington's current system
still appears vulnerable to abuse if its virtually limitless definition of
"mental abnormality" remains untempered. 62
Ill.

CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMAS

From the outset, commentators have argued vehemently over the
constitutionality and validity of Washington's Sexually Violent Predators
law. 63 This section focuses on the constitutional problems facing

predator's commitment will once again continue indefinitely.
58. WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 275-155-040 (1994). This code section requires the
DSHS to develop an individualized treatment plan ("ITP") that includes: (a) a
description of the predator's specific treatment needs; (b) an outline ofintermediate and
long-term treatment goals; (c) treatment strategies; (d) a description of the DSHS staff's
responsibilities; and (e) criteria for recommending whether the predator should be
released. Furthermore, this section provides for a review of the predator's ITP at least
every six months. Id.
59. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 275-155-050 (1994). Some of these rights and
privileges include having an attorney and retaining a "professionally qualified person"
for psychological evaluation, wearing their own clothes and keeping some personal
possessions, having personal storage space, having reasonable telephone and other
correspondence privileges, and having the right to petition the court for release. Id.
60. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995)
("[S]exually violent predators generally have antisocial personality features which are
unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities ....").
61. Norm Maleng, The Community Protection Act and the Sexually Violent
Predators Statute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 821, 825 (1992).
62. For a discussion on the mental illness requirement and the problems related to
it, see infra text accompanying notes 103-21.
63. Compare La Fond, supra note 19 (SVP statute unconstitutional and capricious)
andBrian G. Bodine, Comment, Washington 'sNew Violent Sexual Predator Commitment
System: An Unconstitutional Law and An Unwise Policy Choice, 14 U. PUGET SOUND
L. REV. 105 (1990) (unconstitutional) with Brooks, supra note 19 (law constitutional and
morally acceptable) and Marie A. Bochnewich, Comment, Prediction ofDangerousness
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Washington's SVP law and scrutinizes the Washington State Supreme
Court's decision in In re Young,64 where the court decreed that there
are "no substantive constitutional impediments to the sexually violent
predator scheme."65
In order to determine the validity of the
appellants' ex post facto and double jeopardy claims, Section III.A. of
this Comment concentrates on the question of whether the SVP statute
is civil or punitive in nature. The appellants' substantive due process
claims, which are the strongest challenges set forth by the appellants, are
considered in Section III.B. Section III.C. explores the procedural due
process and equal protection challenges raised by the appellants.
The appeals of Andre Brigham Young and Vance Russell Cunningham
from their respective sexual predator convictions were consolidated by
the Young court. Young's personal restraint petition was filed against
him one day before he was set for release from prison, after serving time
for his latest rape conviction. 66 In an ex parte proceeding, 67 the
judge, after reviewing two psychological evaluations and Young's prior
criminal history, 68 found probable cause for the petition and ordered
Young to the DSHS facility until trial. After hearing testimony from
Young's previous rape victims and starkly contrasting testimony from
expert psychologists for both the prosecution and the defense, the jury

and Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Statute, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 277 (1992)
(constitutionally permissible and morally responsible to restrain offender's liberty).
64. 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993). This case is expected to be appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court. As of the date of printing, a federal district court has reversed the state
supreme court ruling and held that the SVP law is unconstitutional. See Young v.
Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995). An appeal to the Ninth Circuit is
pending.
65. Young, 857 P.2d at 1000.
66. Id at 994.
67. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.040 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
68. Young, 857 P.2d at 994. Young's first known rapes occurred in 1962 when
he was convicted of four counts of first degree rape: Young broke into the respective
homes of four women and forced all of them to have sexual intercourse with him. In
two of these rapes, he threatened the victims with a knife. While on appeal bond for his
1962 rapes, Young entered another woman's home, exposed himself with her child
present, and threatened to hurt the child and rape and kill the woman. Young was scared
away before he could act out his threats. He was charged with attempted rape, but was
held incompetent and was never tried. In 1972, Young was released on parole. Five
years later, he was convicted of another rape after breaking into another woman's home.
Young was released from prison in 1980 and again, five years later, forced his way into
an apartment and raped another woman while three small children were present. Id

1261

unanimously concluded that Young was a sexually violent predator. 69
Since his conviction, Young has been confined at the DSHS facility.
Unlike Young, Cunningham had been a free man for more than four
months, without incident, before prosecutors filed a personal restraint
petition against him. In Cunningham's ex parte proceeding, the judge
found probable cause to issue an arrest warrant after reviewing two
psychological evaluations and Cunningham's history of sexual crimes. 70
At Cunningham's trial, the jury again heard conflicting testimony from
the opposing parties' expert witnesses, testimony from Cunningham's
previous rape victims, his prior criminal history, and Cunningham's own
testimony. After being instructed that unanimity was not required, the
jury returned an eleven-to-one verdict concluding that Cunningham was
a sexually violent predator. 71
A.

Nature of Sexually Violent Predators Law

In order to resolve the appellants' challenges that their constitutional
protection against ex post facto laws and double jeopardy were violated
by the SVP law, the court sought to determine whether the law was civil
or criminal in nature. Generally, the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto
Clauses are only held applicable to punitive statutes. Once a court
establishes that a statute is civil in nature, the double jeopardy and ex
post facto challenges no longer apply. 72 In Young, the majority opinion
first looked to the language of the statute and its legislative history, then
to the purpose and effect of the statutory scheme, in order to determine
whether the SVP law was civil or criminal in nature. 73 The court noted
that the legislature's intent to create a civil rather than criminal statute
was evidenced by the statute's plain language, which calls for a civil

69. Id at 994-95.
70. Id at 995. Cunningham was 26 years old at the time of the petition for his
commitment as a sexual predator. When he was 15 years old, he jumped out of some
bushes in a park and brandished a knife towards a woman and her three children. He
fled when the woman screamed. Cunningham later admitted that he intended to force
the woman to have oral sex with him. Four years later, he raped a woman hitchhiker
after striking her several times and threatening to kill her. He was sentenced to 31
months in prison. In 1987, three months after his November 1986 release, he grabbed
a woman and forced her to have anal intercourse. In April of 1987, he assaulted another
woman in a like manner. Cunningham was convicted for both rapes. Id
71. Id at 995-96.
72. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (deciding ex post facto
issues on civil versus criminal distinctions); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 44748 (1989) (deciding double jeopardy issues based on punitive nature of proposed
scheme).
73. Young, 857 P.2d at 996 (citing two-part analysis from United States v. Ward,
448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
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system of committing sexual predators. The legislative history of the
statute, the court claimed, also indicated a "clear intent" to create a civil
scheme. 74
Next, the court interpreted Allen v. Illinois, 75 a 1986 United States
Supreme Court decision, to resolve the question of whether the actual
impact of the SVP law was civil or criminal. 76 In Allen, the Court
held, in a five-to-four decision, that proceedings under the Illinois
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act were not criminal in nature and,
therefore, the sex offender could not claim a privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. 77 The Allen Court stated that even if a legislature
expressly provides that a statute shall be civil in nature, the defendant
has the opportunity to present the "clearest proof' that the scheme is "so
punitive either in purpose or effect" that it must be considered criminal. 78 The Court found the following facts persuasive: the Illinois
Supreme Court had interpreted the statute as civil in nature; under the
statute, the state has an obligation to provide sex offenders care and
treatment in a special facility; and the court is obliged to discharge the
offender once he or she is no longer dangerous. 79 Based upon these
factors, the Allen Court held that the appellants had failed to meet their
burden of proving that the statute was essentially criminal punishment. 80
Contrary to the appellants' challenges, the Young court cited the
similarities between the Illinois and Washington sex offender schemes
and upheld the SVP's civil stature. The Young court ruled that the
Washington scheme is not focused on punishing offenders, but instead
on providing treatment and protecting society. 81 The Young court

74. Id. at 996-97. The court cited the Governor's Task Force on Community
Protection as support for this proposition, namely the Task Force's recommendation that
a special system of civil commitment be legislated due to the failings of the state's
prevailing criminal justice and civil commitment systems. Id.
75. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
76. Young, 857 P.2d at 997.
77. Allen, 478 U.S. at 375. By doing so, Allen implicitly upheld the Illinois sex
offender civil commitment statute, which is similar to Washington's SVP statute. See
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 725, para. 205 (1994).
78. Allen, 478 U.S. at 369.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 997 (Wash. 1993).

1263

relied on the United States Supreme Court's assertion in Addington v.
Texas 82 that
[t]he state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing
care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for
themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to protect the
community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill. 83

The Young court concluded that the stated goals and intentions of the
legislature to create a civil system were dispositive because there was
insufficient proof of a punitive or illegitimate civil goal. 84 Accordingly, the court held that the commitment scheme was civil in nature and
that the ex post facto and double jeopardy challenges were therefore
inapplicable. 85 However, it appears that the Young majority sidestepped
some important differences between the Washington statute and the
Illinois statute that could greatly affect the analysis of the nature of the
SVP law. First, the Illinois statute instructs that only after a criminal
charge is pending may a prosecutor seek to civilly commit the offender. 86 Second, under the Illinois law, prosecutors may not first seek
criminal penalties and then bring another action seeking commitment
based upon the same incident. 87 Washington's SVP statute is simply
not driven by the same civil goal of providing treatment in lieu of
punishment. "[O]nly after the individual has completed his or her
sentence does the [Washington] Statute purportedly seek to provide
specialized 'care and treatment' for the individual."88
Although there are some significant differences between the Illinois
statute and Washington's SVP law, the United States Supreme Court
would likely uphold the SVP law as civil in nature, because
Washington's commitment scheme appears to have the legitimate goals
of protecting society and treating offenders. Thus, the Court would
likely deny the appellants' ex post facto and double jeopardy challenges.
This forecast is also based upon the Court's Allen decision, the present
conservative make-up of the Court, and the fact that the SVP law

82. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
83. Young, 857 P.2d at 1000 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426
(1979)).
84. Id at 998-99.
85. Id at 999.
86. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 725, para. 205/3 (1994). The critical difference is that in
Washington, civil commitment may be initiated after the individual has already served
a lengthy criminal sentence. In Illinois, the individual must perpetrate a new offense and
the prosecutor must, after some investigation, decide whether to divert the individual for
treatment rather than criminal prosecution.
87. People v. Patch, 293 N.E.2d 661, 665 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
88. Young, 857 P.2d at 1025 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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disavows an interest in punishment, provides treatment, and provides
procedures to effectuate release.

B.

Substantive Due Process

Opponents of the Sexually Violent Predator law claim that the statute
violates the substantive due process rights of the accused because the law
does not serve a valid state interest and it imprisons individuals who are
not mentally ill. 89 Section III.B.1. considers the competing interests
between the individual and the state and strictly scrutinizes the SVP law
and the Young court's analysis of that law. Section III.B.2. focuses on
arguably the greatest obstacle to the SVP scheme: the Washington
Legislature's vague definition of "mental abnormality."

1.

Strict Scrutiny of Washington 's Statute

An individual's interest in liberty is a fundamental concept of AngloAmerican law. When the government seeks to infringe on this
fundamental right, the courts are empowered to strictly scrutinize the
statute to ensure that the state's interests are compelling and that the
statute is narrowly drawn to accomplish those interests. 90
Although the Young court proclaimed that "it is irrefutable that the
State has a compelling interest both in treating sex predators and
protecting society from their actions,"91 this statement may be only
partially supportable. Unquestionably, the government has a strong
interest in protecting the public from dangerous, mentally ill sex
offenders. However, how can the state possess a compelling interest in
treating sex offenders when effective treatment, according to the statute
itself, simply does not exist?92 This appears to be a counter-intuitive
proposition. In response, some argue that efficacy of treatment is not a
constitutional requirement. 93 If this argument is correct, the Young

89. Id at 1000.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750-51 (1987).
91. Young, 857 P.2d at 1000.
92. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
"[S]exually violent predators generally have antisocial personality features which are
unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities .... [T]he prognosis for
curing sexually violent offenders is poor .... " Id
93. Professor Brooks asserted:
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court's reliance on "treatment" is an unnecessary fiction. Alternatively,
if effective treatment is constitutionally required, what level of effectiveness would satisfy the Due Process Clause? Justifying a precise level of
accomplishment for psychiatric treatment is not only difficult, it may be
impossible. For some mental defects, there are established modes of
treatment that can be followed, whereas for others, such as violent sex
offenders, there is simply no known, effective solution. Constitutionally
demanding a substantive and successful treatment program where one
does not exist would be irrational. Therefore, the most equitable
solution would be to require the state to provide "reasonable" psychiatric
treatment regardless of efficacy until such time as an effective treatment
is discovered. In sexual predator cases, the required treatment should
not focus on effectiveness, but on its undertaking and availability. The
Young court acknowledged this reality. 94 By providing the sexual
predator with individualized care, treatment, and special confinement
conditions at the DSHS facility, 95 the SVP law probably meets the
requisite level of treatment required by the Constitution. 96 The state's
interests in protecting society and treating offenders are of such a quality
that they would satisfy the "compelling state interest" prong of the strict
scrutiny test.
In order to pass the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, the statute
must also be drawn as narrowly as possible to achieve the state's
interests. The appellants in Young successfully argued that the SVP law

[I]f the [Sexually Violent Predators] statute is perceived as primarily a
'treatment program,' and if treatment is not likely to work, there appears to be
a massive hypocrisy if violent sexual offenders are confined, ostensibly to treat
them, when the likelihood of success is remote.... But it must be recognized
that the goal of the ... statute is not primarily treatment. The statute is
designed to confine an extremely limited number of dangerous and mentally
abnormal persons because they are too dangerous to be at large.... It is not
[constitutionally] necessary that treatment be efficacious.
Brooks, supra note 19, at 735.
94. The court remarked:
[T]he mere fact that an illness is difficult to treat does not mean that it is not
an illness. For example, some forms of schizophrenia cannot be treated, but
the diagnosis nonetheless remains a valid one. The Legislature should not be
admonished for its honest recognition of the difficulties inherent in treating
those afflicted with the mental abnormalities causing the sex predator
condition.
Young, 857 P.2d at 1003.
95. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE§§ 275-155-030 to 050 (1994).
96. See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986) (stating that confinement
for a sexual psychopath is unlike that for a felon because the state provides special
treatment and psychiatric care); cf Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982)
(holding that a mentally retarded individual has constitutionally protected liberty interests
in reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily
restraints, and minimally adequate training).
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violated this second prong because it did not afford consideration of less
restrictive alternatives to confinement. 97 However, the Young court
resolved this problem by reading into the statute the need for courts to
consider whether less restrictive alternatives are feasible on a case-bycase basis. 98 In its efforts to conform the SVP statute to Washington's
existing short-term mental health commitment statute, the Young
majority's penmanship frustrates the legislature's stated intent99 and
fails to conform to its own analysis. 100 Although the court correctly
decided that the SVP law violated the appellants' substantive due process
rights by not considering less restrictive alternatives, it should have left
any proposed changes for the legislature. By playing the role of a superlegislature, the court failed to apply the second prong of the strict
scrutiny test-whether the statute as a whole is narrowly tailored to
achieve its ends. 101 The SVP law's sweeping authority to snatch

97. Young, 857 P.2d at 1012. The court stated that the SVP statute violates equal
protection principles because Washington's existing mental health commitment statute
requires the consideration of less restrictive alternatives. "The State cannot provide
different procedural protections for those.confined under the sex predator statute unless
there is a valid reason for doing so." Id For a more thorough discussion of the equal
protection claims, see infra notes 122-41, 146-57 and accompanying text.
98. Id
99. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
100. The majority stated: "Given the nature of sexually violent predators, it would
not be safe to house them in a less secure setting.... [T]he dangerousness of committed
sex predators justifies a secure confinement facility." Young, 857 P.2d at 1005. Later,
the majority flip-flopped and stated: "Here, the State offers no justification for not
considering less restrictive alternatives under [Washington's mental health commitment
statute] and denying the same under [the SVP law]." Id at 1012. The court's call for
less restrictive alternatives cannot be harmonized with its stated belief that sexual
predators are so dangerous that they should be kept in a special maximum security
facility.
101. See id at 1012. The Young court concedes that the statute is not narrowly
drawn when it proclaims that "[n]ot all sex predators present the same level of danger,
nor do they require identical treatment conditions .... [I]t is necessary to account for
these differences by considering alternatives to total confinement." Id This commentator urges not only consideration of these alternatives, but codification of these
alternatives to avoid inequitable, unjust, and unconstitutional results.
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individuals from society is unnecessarily broad 102 and would not pass
a properly administered strict scrutiny test.
2.

Mental Illness, Dangerousness, and Preventative Detention

The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause requires a
finding of both dangerousness and mental illness before a state in a civil
proceeding can commit a person involuntarily to a mental facility. 103
Opponents of the SVP scheme claim that Washington's law mandates
unconstitutional preventative detention because some sex offenders, who
do not suffer from a mental illness that is recognized by psychiatry, will
be committed and also because psychiatry cannot accurately predict
dangerousness or likelihood of recidivism. 104 The United States
Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Foucha v. Louisiana105 provides
guidance on what magnitude of mental incapacity and dangerousness is
constitutionally required.
In Foucha, the Court reviewed a Louisiana statute that permitted the
confinement of an insanity acquittee on the grounds that the individual
in question was dangerous and had some lack of mental health. After
being found not guilty of aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of
a firearm by reason of insanity, Foucha was committed to a mental
hospital in Louisiana. 106 Three and one-half years later, a review panel
recommended that Foucha be conditionally discharged because he no
longer suffered from the drug-induced psychosis that impelled his
commitment. 107 At a subsequent hearing, court-appointed doctors
testified that although the defendant showed no signs of mental illness,
Foucha did display an antisocial personality. The doctors added that
they could not comfortably state whether Foucha would pose a danger
to himself or others. 108 Based on this testimony, the trial court found
Foucha dangerous to himself or others and ordered him recommitted to

102. For example, the legislature's definition of "mental abnormality" is circular
and can be manipulated to incarcerate individuals with quite mild mental problems.
Mental abnormality, as vaguely defined by the legislature, unnecessarily exposes many
to confinement who do not exhibit traits of traditional mental illness.
The broad scope of Washington's SVP law is also evidenced by the fact that its
qualifying crimes range from one extreme, murder-rape, all the way down to attempted
sexually motivated burglary. Young, 857 P.2d at 1024 (Johnson, J., dissenting),
103. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 425-27 (1979).
104. Bochnewich, supra note 63, at 283.
105. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
106. Id. at 73-74.
107. Id. at 74.
108. Id. at 74-75. The doctors also cited a number of altercations Foucha had with
other patients at the hospital. Id.
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the mental hospital. The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the decision
and the case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 109
Justice White wrote the Court's plurality opinion, which held that the
Louisiana scheme violated Foucha's substantive due process, procedural
due process, and equal protection rights. 110 The Court flatly rejected
Louisiana's assertion that diagnosis of an "antisocial personality" could
satisfy the mental illness requirement imposed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.m Because Foucha suffered
from no mental illness, the Court declared his continued civil confinement unconstitutional.
According to the Young court, its holding-that Washington's
commitment scheme comports with the mental illness and dangerousness
requirements of the Due Process Clause- is in accord with the Foucha
decision. 112 The Young majority said the Louisiana civil commitment
statute was struck down because the state attempted to continue the
defendant's commitment when he only displayed an antisocial personality rather than a mental illness. The court observed that an antisocial
personality is formally designated by psychiatrists as "antisocial
behavior" and, therefore, is not a mental disorder or illness. 113 In
contrast, the SVP legislation requires a current finding of either a
"personality disorder," that is, a disorder recognized by psychiatric
medicine, or a "mental abnormality" before permitting civil commitment. 114 "Mental abnormality" is not a psychiatric term, but is
legislatively defined as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the
emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to the
commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting such person
a menace to the health and safety of others." 115The court acknowledged that by "using the concept of 'mental abnormality' the Legislature

109. Id at 75.
110. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
111. Id at 75-80. Because "Foucha is not suffering from a mental disease or illness
... he should not be held as a mentally ill person." Id at 79. The state may civilly
confine a person if it shows that "the individual is mentally ill and dangerous. Here, the
State has not carried that burden." Id at 80 (citation omitted).
112. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1006 (Wash. 1993).
113. Id. at 1006-07 n.12. The court relied on the American Psychiatric
Association's (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders for its
psychiatric definitions.
114. Id.
115. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
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has invoked a more generalized terminology that can cover a much
larger variety of disorders." 116 The Young court believed that "mental
abnormality" would be analogous to the Addington and Foucha mental
illness prerequisite, provided that "psychiatric and psychological
clinicians who testify in good faith as to mental abnormality are able to
identify sexual pathologies that are as real and meaningful as other
pathologies. " 117
This analysis by the Young court is incomplete because it avoids the
issue of what level of mental incapacity must be shown before the state
is constitutionally permitted to civilly confine its citizens. 118Although
mental health practitioners are most capable of diagnosing mental illness,
the legislature and courts must be the ones to determine what level of
mental incompetence is needed before constitutionally permitting civil
commitment. The practical impact of the Young court's decision is that
psychiatrists are bestow·ed not only with the power to determine future
dangerousness, a sketchy proposition at best, 119but also the unbridled
latitude to create any good faith argument that a mental disorder meets

116. Young, 857 P.2d at 1001.
117. Id. (quoting Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionalityand Morality ofCivilly
Committed Violent Sexual Predators, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 709, 733 (1992).
118. For example, the APA currently classifies paraphilia (a type of sexual disorder)
as either mild, moderate, or severe. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC &
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 281 (3d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSMIII-R]. Following the court's expansive interpretation of"mental abnormality," a sex
offender could be committed indefinitely for even a mild paraphilia as long as health
care practitioners testify in good faith that the offender has an abnormality and that they
believe the offender might be dangerous in the future. Is this enough to constitutionally
warrant indefinite commitment? Although Washington has been cautious in selecting
offenders with pronounced mental ailments, the court's flexible interpretation of"mental
abnormality" and "personality disorder" opens a Pandora's box for future misuse and
unconstitutional detention.
119. According to one commentator:
The state will attempt to [prove mental abnormality and dangerousness] by
presenting psychiatrists and other mental health professionals who will testify
that the person has the requisite abnormality and propensity to commit violent
sex crimes. Even though these professionals cannot make reliable predictions
concerning recidivism, this evidence is difficult to undermine for several
reasons. The trier of fact ... is likely to find the testimony of specialists
persuasive. Also, as the [American Psychiatric Association] observes, the
adversely affected party will find it hard to challenge this testimony effectively:
Because most psychiatrists do not believe that they possess the expertise
to make long-term predictions of dangerousness, they cannot dispute the
conclusions of the few who do ....
In a typical case, then, the defendant's inability to find a psychiatrist who will
make the long-term prediction that the defendant will not be a recidivist
cripples his or her defense.
Gleb, supra note 6, at 233-34 (citations omitted).
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the statute's definition, regardless of whether the claimed disorder is
recognized by contemporary psychiatry.
Washington's definition of "mental abnormality" is too nebulous and
imprecise to support the indefinite incarceration of an individual. The
Young court did not place enough importance on Justice White's
admonition in Foucha:
[T]he State asserts that because Foucha once committed a criminal act and now
has an antisocial personality that sometimes leads to aggressive conduct, a
disorder for which there is no effecti:ve treatment, he may be held indefinitely.
This rationale would permit the State to hold indefinitely any other insanity
acquittee not mentally ill who could be shown to have a personality disorder
that may lead to criminal conduct. The same would be true of any convicted
criminal, even though he has completed his prison term. It would also be only
a step away from substituting confinements for dangerousness for our present
system which, with only narrow exceptions and aside from permissible
confinements for mental illness, incarcerates only those who are proved beyond
reasonable doubt to have violated a criminal law. 120

Therefore, the definition of "mental abnormality" should be narrowed
from the Young court's standard of "any good faith assertion" to include
only pathologies and disorders that are recognized by mainstream
psychiatry. Doing so will (1) provide guidance and limits to psychiatrists, prosecutors, courts, and juries; (2) meet the constitutionally
dictated mental illness requirement; and (3) lessen the possibility of
erroneous confinement. Unfortunately, the Young court did not seize
upon the opportunity to clarify Washington's "mental abnormality"
definition and still find a mental illness from the facts in the case before
it-both appellants had been diagnosed with a severe paraphilia, a sexual
disorder currently recognized by the American Psychiatric Association. 121
C.

Procedural Due Process & Equal Protection

The appellants and amicus curiae in Young argued that the SVP law
is unconstitutional because it violates the rights granted to the appellants

120. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82-83 (1992).
121. Young, 857 P.2d at 1002. The APA defines paraphilia as a sexual disorder that
features "recurrent intense sexual urges and sexually arousing fantasies generally
involving either (1) nonhuman objects, (2) the suffering or humiliation of oneself or
one's partner (not merely simulated), or (3) children or other nonconsenting persons."
Id. (quoting DSM-III-R, supra note 118, at 279).
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by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 122 In particular, the petitioners maintained that these
rights were violated because the law authorizes ex parte hearings,
permits non-unanimous jury verdicts, and denies accused predators the
right to remain silent. 123 Although the SVP law arguably possesses
some of these alleged procedural deficiencies, it is unlikely that any of
these deficiencies rise to the level of constitutional violations, because
the SVP law meets all of the applicable constitutional standards for an
individual to be involuntarily civilly committed.
Before an individual may be committed, a state must show, in a
sufficiently reliable manner, that the goal it seeks to achieve outweighs
the individual's interest in not being involuntarily confined. 124 Due
process requires that the nature of commitment bear some reasonable
relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed125 and
that involuntary commitment continue only so long as there is a
constitutional basis for it. 126 Three distinct factors must be considered
in the procedural due process balancing test: (I) the private interest, (2)
the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of additional or substitute
safeguards, and (3) the government's interest. 127 The state must
shoulder the burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence, a
"middle level" of proof that is higher than the preponderance of the
evidence standard, but lower than the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard. 128 In addition to these due process requirements, equal
protection requires that any distinction made between groups of people
must have some rational relation to the purpose for which the distinction
is made. 129
Involuntary civil commitment is a serious infringement on an
individual's liberty interest 130 and can lead to significant, "adverse
social consequences." 131 Because of this, the state is constitutionally
122. Id at 1009.
123. Id
124. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
125. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983).
126. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-78 (1992). The court applied the
reasoning from its earlier decisions in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574-75
(1975), and Jones, 463 U.S. at 368, 370.
127. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
128. Addington, 441 U.S. at 431-33.
129. Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966). In a subsequent case, the
Supreme Court applied the Baxtromrationale and held that sexual psychopaths could not
be denied due process protections accorded the mentally ill without citing some sort of
characteristic applicable to sex offenders that would make the denial of protections
sensible. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 512 (1972).
130. Jones, 463 U.S. at 361.
13 I. Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-26.
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permitted to deprive an individual of liberty only in certain narrow
circumstances and only after invoking an array of procedural safeguards.132 These circumstances exist when the state, under its police
power, seeks to commit an individual who suffers from a mental illness
and is dangerous. 133 The severe consequences associated with erroneous, indefinite commitment necessitate expanded procedures. Accordingly, Washington's SVP Act has many procedural safeguards that
conform to and even surpass those approved by the Foucha and Allen
Courts. 134 However, due to the significant negative impact of a
possibly indefinite period of confinement, it is important to scrutinize the
Act's existing procedures, or lack thereof, that tend to abridge fairness
or increase the possibility of erroneous commitment.
The SVP statute allows court proceedings that exclude the charged
individual from appearing during the probable cause hearing 135 or
other hearings during the forty-five day pretrial period. 136 However,
Washington's existing civil commitment statute for the mentally ill
affords an individual the opportunity to be present at a probable cause
hearing within seventy-two hours of detention and have a psychological
evaluation within twenty-four hours of detention. 137 The petitioners
in Young did not receive notice of the petition and the judicial determination of probable cause was made ex parte. 138 Furthermore, both
were denied the opportunity to personally appear in court during the
forty-five day pretrial period. 139 Due to the fact that Washington has
given these procedural rights to similarly situated mental health patients,
the Young court construed the statute so as to provide accused sexual
predators with the right to be present at a probable cause hearing

132. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 79-82 (1992).
133. Id
134. These include the right to a full adversarial proceeding, jury trial, legal
representation, experts for psychological examinations, trial within 45 days after the
filing of the petition, the state bearing the burden of the highest standard of proof, annual
mental examinations, and procedures for petitioning for release. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 71.09.020-.100 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
135. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.040 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
136. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.050 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
137. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1010 (Wash. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 71.05.200-.210 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
138. Young, 857 P.2d at 1010.
139. Id at 1009-10.
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conducted within seventy-two hours of his or her detention. 140 The
Young court construed the statute in this manner in order to ensure that
the statute was constitutional. The United States Supreme Court is likely
to agree that due process similarly requires notice and the opportunity
to be promptly heard at a probable cause hearing: 141
In Young the SVP statute was construed by one of the trial courts to
allow a non-unanimous jury verdict. 142 Because the statute was silent
on the issue, the Young court looked at the SVP law's burden of proof
to determine the legislature's intent. 143 Based on the heightened
burden of proof and the unanimity that is generally required by that
standard, the court ruled that the legislature intended to include the need
for a unanimous jury verdict in the statutory scheme. 144 Although the
Supreme Court only requires that the state prove its case by clear and
convincing evidence, 145 future commitment schemes would be wise to
follow Washington's lead and adopt the highest standard of proof, as
well as unanimity of verdicts, in order to increase fairness and dissipate
the inherent risks of programs that endorse possible lifetime confinements.
Although the Washington Legislature purposely avoided incorporating
an overt act requirement into the SVP law, the Young court held that a
recent overt act is required for those individuals who were already free
from prison, but not for individuals committed directly from prison. 146
Recent overt act requirements were derived from the belief that the
finding of a recent overt act would lend accuracy and objectivity to
dangerousness predictions. Requiring a recent overt act in cases where

140. Id. at 1011. The court then ruled that the failure to afford the petitioners these
procedures had no bearing on the outcome and was therefore harmless error. Id. at
1011-12.
141. Although the Young court was bound by equal protection principles to choose
a 72-hour period (mentally ill were permitted by statute to attend the probable cause
hearing), the Supreme Court is likely to defer to state determinations of what is the
proper period of time, whether the period is shorter or longer, within reason. See, e.g.,
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (holding that an arrestee is entitled
to a prompt detention hearing).
142. Young, 857P.2dat 1012. Cunningham'sjuryreturnedwithan 11-to-l verdict
after the trial court did not instruct the jury that unanimity was required. Id.
143. Id. In Addington, the Court remarked: "Increasing the burden of proof is one
way to impress the fact finder with the importance of the decision and thereby perhaps
to reduce the chances that inappropriate commitments will be ordered." Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979).
144. Young, 857 P.2d at 1012. Due to the fact that petitioner Cunningham was
convicted based upon an 11-to-1 jury verdict, the court found the verdict "insufficient."
However, petitioner Young was convicted based upon a unanimous jury verdict and,
therefore, the court affirmed his jury's findings. Id.
145. Addington, 441 U.S. at 431-33.
146. Young, 857 P.2d at 1009.
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the offender is in prison is not practicable because imprisoned offenders
have "little or no opportunity to commit an overt sexually violent
act." 147 The Young court agreed that requiring prisoners to commit an
overt sexually violent act would be illogical. 148 However, the court
was constrained by existing case law 149 and, therefore, read an overt
act requirement into the SVP statute for individuals not incarcerated at
the time a petition is filed against them. Absent a similarly restrictive
precedent, other jurisdictions need not be likewise encumbered. Forcing
prosecutors to prove a recent overt act before committing sexual
predators, even those already free in the community, is tantamount to
emasculating the main purpose behind any sexual predator legislation:
societal protection. It is reprehensible to wait for another sexual assault
to occur before taking action when there is ample proof that the
individual in question is mentally ill, has prior violent sex offense
convictions, and is likely to re-offend. Requiring an overt act of
violence before permitting involuntary commitment of either imprisoned
or already released offenders is an unreasonable burden because
requiring evidence of a single overt act adds little or nothing to ensure
an accurate prediction of future dangerousness. 150 Psychiatrists believe
that they are competent at predicting future behavior even without
evidence of a recent overt act. 151 Because overt act prerequisites do
not increase the reliability of predicting future dangerousness, sexual
predators derive no due process benefit from the added "protection." 152
If a jurisdiction does require an overt act, the legislature should opt to
reshape its definition to include overt physical manifestations as well as
any credible evidence of dangerousness, including correspondence, notes,

147. Brooks, supra note 19, at 751. "[D]uring confinement these offenders do not
have access to potential victims and therefore will not engage in an overt act during
confinement." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
148. Young, 857P.2dat 1008-09. WhenCalifornia'ssexoffendercivil commitment
system was in operation, a California appellate court also rejected the claim that due
process required a recent overt act for prisoners: "Due process does not require that the
absurd be done before a compelling state interest can be vindicated." People v. Martin,
107 Cal. App. 3d 714, 725, 165 Cal. Rptr. 773, 780 (1980).
149. See In re Harris, 654 P.2d 109 (Wash. 1982) (requiring an overt act before the
state can commit a mentally disordered individual).
150. See, e.g., Mathew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707, 710 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (expert
witnesses testified that evidence of one recent overt act does little, if anything, to sharpen
the accuracy of a dangerousness prediction).
151. Id. at 710-11.
152. Brooks, supra note 19, at 751.
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and statements made by the predator which exhibit a desire to commit
future harm.
The Young petitioners also argued that they were unconstitutionally
denied the right to remain silent in violation of their Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination when they were ordered by the trial
court to speak to the state's psychologists. 153 The petitioners' arguments are likely to be insupportable because the Supreme Court held in
Allen that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply to non-criminal
proceedings and that due process does not independently require
application of the privilege. 154 A more persuasive argument is that
equal protection mandates application of the privilege against selfincrimination to sexual predators because Washington's mentally ill are
granted the privilege. 155 Although the Young court casually dismissed
the petitioners' equal protection claim, 156 the United States Supreme
Court, if Foucha's plurality can gain a swing vote, should hold that
sexual predators are indeed similarly situated to the mentally insane and
that the state violated equal protection principles when it denied sexual
predators the right to remain silent. 157

153. Young, 857 P.2d at 1013.
154. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 375 (1986).
155. Young, 857 P.2d at 1014.
156. The Young majority's equal protection stance, which denied accused sexual
predators the right to remain silent, is diametrically opposed to its equal protection
analysis for the less restrictive alternatives to confinement requirement, supra text
accompanying notes 97-102, and the recent overt act requirement, supra text accompanying notes 146-48. Surprisingly, the court stated:
[W]e see good reasons to refuse the statutory right to remain silent to sexually
violent predators even though the Legislature has granted such a right to the
mentally ill.... [S]exually violent predators are not similarly situated to the
mentally ill in regard to the treatment methods employed, or the information
necessary to ensure that they receive proper diagnosis and treatment.
Young, 857 P.2d at 1014. The majority's treatment of the equal protection questions and
its treatment of the due process questions are wholly inconsistent. Id at 1022 n.5
(Johnson, J., dissenting).
157. Foucha indicated that absent a convincing reason for the disparity in procedural
rights between similarly situated groups (the Court cited the difference between insane
persons who had the right to remain silent and a now sane acquittee who was denied that
right), the law would violate the Equal Protection Clause. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S.
71, 84-86 (1992). Interestingly, the Young court denied the appellants' equal protection
claims on the issue of the right to remain silent, whereas, earlier in its opinion, the court
asserted that sexual predators and the mentally ill were indistinct groups deserving of
the same rights to appear within 72 hours at probable cause hearings. See supra notes
135-41 and accompanying text.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

California's "one strike" law will significantly increase the length of
prison sentences for individuals who commit sex offenses in the future.
However, the "one strike" law cannot protect Californians from
dangerous sex offenders who are presently nearing release from prison
or have already been released from prison. The character of our system
of justice, based on individual liberty, should not be radically altered in
order to prevent all sex offenders from committing sex crimes.
Nevertheless, a subgroup of the sex offender population can be stopped.
This subgroup-sexual predators-can be prevented from committing
another rape, molestation, or murder. However, the only plausible way
to adequately protect society and preserve our system's essence of
freedom is through a narrowly drawn civil commitment statute. The
Supreme Court has held that commitment is proper upon a finding of
mental illness and dangerousness. Furthermore, principles of fairness,
morality, and dignity require additional precautions. The "one strike"
legislation took a considerable step forward in protecting society from
sex offenders. Washington's SVP law took another step to protect its
citizenry, but because of its vague definitions, unequal treatment of
sexual predators, and potential for inconsistent and erroneous application,
that law is ill-suited for California's populace. Furthermore, the SVP
law fails to truly consider appropriate alternatives to indefinite confinement and is likely to violate the offender's substantive due process
rights. By enacting a more balanced civil commitment approach like
that proposed by the Model Sexual Predators Act, which follows in the
Appendix, California will maximize the protection of its citizenry while
still safeguarding principles of fairness and the accused individual's
interest in liberty.
PETER

A. ZAMOYSKI
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APPENDIX

THE MODEL SEXUAL PREDATORS ACT (MSPA)
§ 1. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE
The Legislature finds that there is a small, but extremely dangerous,
group of sexual predators whose mental defects and dangerousness
render them inappropriate for confinement under the existing civil
commitment act. The current criminal justice and short-term civil
commitment systems cannot properly address the problem of sexual
predators whose prison terms have expired, or are presently expiring,
and who are still regarded as extremely dangerous.
The Legislature expressly denounces any desire to punish the
individuals' past actions. Individuals who are eligible for criminal
prosecution for committing sexually violent offenses are not appropriate
for inclusion under the provisions of this Act. This Act is intended to
create a civil commitment system that provides a range of treatment
plans and confinement alternatives in order to provide long-term care for
sexual predators and, at the same time, promote the public's safety.
COMMENTARY

Section 1 of the MSPA 1 states that the existing criminal and civil
commitment statutes are ineffective at stopping sexual predators.
Although sentence enhancing laws, such as California's "one strike" law,
greatly enhance the sentences for newly convicted sex offenders, the
current criminal justice system is ineffective because it must wait for
another offense to be perpetrated, even when there is significant
evidence that a prior offender is still dangerous. 2 The current civil
commitment scheme is ineffective because it is a short-term system
designed for individuals who do not pose as serious a risk of violence.
Additionally, sexual predators need special confinement and long-term
treatment.

1. MODEL SEXUAL PREDA TORS ACT [hereinafter MSPA]. The first paragraph of
MSPA § 1 is an altered version of WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1995).
2. The criminal justice system is usually appropriate only after a criminal offense
has been committed. The exceptions to the rule occur when there is an attempt or
conspiracy to commit the offense. Sexual predators who are nearing release from prison
do not fit within these two exceptions.
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Individuals eligible for criminal prosecution are inappropriate for civil
commitment under the MSPA. 3 This clause in section 1 is intended to
inhibit prosecutors from using the civil system as an alternative to the
criminal justice system. The Act's provisions are simply not intended
to reach every accused sex offender. Because of effective sentence
enhancing laws, such as the "one strike" law, only those prisoners who
are nearing release, or have been recently released, and are still
extremely dangerous should be considered for commitment under the
civil system. 4
§ 2. DEFINITIONS
For purposes of this Act, the terms defined in this section shall apply
throughout the statute.
(1) "Sexual Predator" means any person who: (a) has committed
more than one sexually violent offense, (b) suffers from a mental illness,
and (c) poses a danger to commit future sexually violent offenses against
the public.
(2) "Sexually violent offense" means any criminal conviction or
acquittal by reason of insanity for:
(a) "Harmful sexual conduct" that resulted in serious physical or
emotional harm to another. Harmful sexual conduct includes, but is not
limited to, the following felonies: first or second degree rape, first or
second degree rape by forcible compulsion, rape of a child under age
fourteen, first or second degree sexual assault, first or second degree
sexual assault of a child under age fourteen, indecent liberties by forcible
compulsion, indecent liberties with a child under age fourteen, incest
against a child under age fourteen, first or secorid degree child molestation, any felony sexual offense analogous to harmful sexual conduct as
defined in this paragraph or any comparable federal or out-of-state

3. The prohibition against including individuals subject to penal laws is derived
in part from the Illinois statute, which forces a prosecutor to choose between a civil or
criminal trial at the outset of the proceedings. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 725, para. 205/3
( 1994). Under the Illinois system, a prosecutor may not first seek criminal penalties and
then bring another action seeking commitment based upon the same incident. People v.
Patch, 293 N.E.2d 661 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973). Under the MSPA, a prosecutor does not
have the choice. If the individual is alleged to have committed a new offense, the
prosecutor must bring criminal charges.
4. The reason for limiting the scope of the Act is that prior sentences for sex
offenders have been relatively short although the offenses were quite violent. See supra
note 39.
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felony sexual offense that would constitute harmful sexual conduct as
defined in this paragraph;
(b) "Sexually motivated offenses." This paragraph only applies to
convictions of first or second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter,
unlawful imprisonment, kidnapping, arson, first degree burglary,
harassment, or stalking. In order for one of the crimes listed in this
paragraph to satisfy the sexually violent offense prerequisite, the sexual
motivation for the crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
either at the time of sentencing for the crime or at the civil commitment
proceedings;
(c) Attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy to commit
any of the felony offenses described in paragraphs (a) or (b) of this
subsection; or
( d) "Deviant sexual conduct" that resulted in physical or emotional
harm to another. Deviant sexual conduct is a sexual offense of lower
culpability than harmful sexual conduct. Felony sexual offenses not
otherwise covered under paragraphs (a), (b), or (c) of this subsection fall
within deviant sexual conduct.
(3) "Mental illness" means any sexual, personal, or other mental
illness, disorder, or dysfunction existing for no less than three months
prior to the filing of the petition that is hereinafter provided. The
illness, disorder, or dysfunction must be one recognized by mainstream
psychiatric medicine. To determine the proper level of treatment and
confinement, the individual's mental illness shall be classified as either
mild, moderate, or severe.
(4) "Danger to commit future sexually violent offenses" means the
strong or very strong likelihood that an individual will engage in any of
the sexually violent offenses defined in subsection (2) at some point in
the future.
(5) "Offenses against the public" means any acts directed towards
strangers or individuals with whom a relationship has been established
or promoted for the purpose of victimization.
(6) "Alternative housing facility" means any facility, such as a halfway house, designed to treat, oversee, and restrict, but not totally
confine, the movements of less menacing sexual predators.
(7) "Secure facility" means a special maximum security facility, not
located on the grounds of a state mental facility, with the purpose of
confining, caring for, and treating sexual predators.
(8) "Mental health professional" means any person certified or
licensed in the State to practice as a mental health counselor, psychiatric
nurse, psychiatrist, psychologist, or social worker.
(9) "Mental health evaluation" means a determination, by at least two
qualified mental health professionals who have personally examined the
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alleged sexual predator, of whether the individual suffers from a mental
illness that makes it likely the individual will engage in future sexually
violent offenses against the public. The evaluation shall include
suggestions for the appropriate levels of confinement, care, and treatment
and the anticipated duration of the necessary confinement, care, and
treatment.
COMMENTARY

Section 2 is devoted to defining the relevant terms used throughout the
Act. The definition of "Sexual Predator" under the MSPA5 is principally derived from other jurisdictions' commitment statutes, 6 the case law
of those jurisdictions, and this commentator's own insights. 7 By
requiring more than one conviction for a sexually violent offense, 8
rather than merely being charged, the MSPA assures that the offender
has at least some sort of proven history of recidivism that makes him or
her worthy of these extraordinary measures. 9 The MSPA's requirement
of the presence of a mental illness for at least three months 10 before
permitting involuntary commitment is derived from the Foucha decision,
the Illinois statute, and equal protection considerations. Foucha's
plurality adhered to Addington, holding that civil commitment is

5. MSPA § 2(1).
6. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02(18b) (West 1995); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 725, para.
205/1.01 (1994).
7. E.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash.
1993); People v. Patch, 293 N.E.2d 661 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
8. MSPA § 2(1)(a).
9. For example, the Washington statute encompasses "any person who has been
convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence." WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 71.09.020 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). Minnesota's statute authorizes commitment
after the person "has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct . . . that creates a
substantial likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm." MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 253B.02(7a), (18b) (West 1995). Perpetration of enumerated crimes leads to a
"rebuttable presumption that [the] conduct described ... creates a substantial likelihood
that a victim will suffer serious physical or emotional harm." MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 253B.02(7a) (West 1995). Both jurisdictions' statutes inherently allow for commitment
of offenders who have not been criminally convicted of even one offense. However,
Washington' sAttomey General reportedly requires a pattern of sexually violent behavior
before a petition can be filed. See Brooks, supra text note 19, at 714-15. The MSPA
codifies this requirement directly into its definition of "sexual predator."
10. MSPA § 2(1)(b), (3).
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appropriate only upon a finding of mental illness and dangerousness. 11
Although the Court did not specify exactly what constitutes a mental
illness, this commentator believes the Court will require, at the very
least, that the dysfunction or disorder be one recognized by mainstream
psychiatry, such as the American Psychiatric Association. 12 Requiring
a recognized mental illness lends credibility to the commitment. The
MSPA's three month period of mental illness was so chosen in order to
exclude individuals who are experiencing only temporary mental
imbalances. 13 Furthermore, the MSPA instructs the evaluating mental
health professionals to classify the individual's mental illness as either
mild, moderate, or severe. 14 This will compel evaluators to sharpen
their diagnoses within reasonable parameters and provide all involved
parties with a better assessment of the individual's mental illness. At the
same time, the classification will enable the court to reach a more
informed decision on the proper level of confinement.
A verifiable mental illness is a prerequisite to any involuntary civil
commitment. A civil commitment system that requires dangerousness
without mental illness would be difficult to justify under an equal
protection theory. Why would sex offenders be the only individuals
dangerous enough to warrant civil commitment? What justification
could there be for committing sex offenders but not other dangerous
people, such as murderers? 15 If dangerousness alone could justify civil
commitment, our present system of punishment, which incarcerates
individuals only upon violation of a criminal law, would be usurped and

11.

For a discussion of these requirements, see supra text accompanying notes 103-

21.
12. Contra In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1001 (Wash. 1993) (allowing a finding of
"mental abnormality" upon a good faith identification of mental pathology).
13. Similarly, the Illinois statute calls for a mental disorder that exists for at least
one year prior to the filing ofa petition. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 725, para. 205/1.01 (1994).
The MSPA only requires three months as opposed to the Illinois one-year period of
mental illness because of the MSPA's allowance for less restrictive confinement
alternatives instead of across-the-board indefinite commitments. See MSPA§ 5.2. Also,
because the MSPA is founded on the belief that sexual predators are not appropriate for
short-term commitment, the three-month requirement assures proper use of the existing
mental health and commitment system.
14. MSPA § 2(3).
15. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 84-86 (1992). Justice White's
dangerousness-equal protection argument can be easily applied to sexual predator civil
commitment schemes:
Many [criminals] will likely suffer from the same sort of personality disorder
that Foucha exhibits. However, state law does not allow for their continuing
confinement based merely on dangerousness. Instead, the State controls the
behavior of these similarly situated citizens by relying on other means, such
as punishment, deterrence, and supervised release.
Id.
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our nation's present system, which is based on individual liberty, would
be ominously transformed into a police state.
The MSPA, like other sex offender commitment statutes, includes the
likelihood of dangerousness as a key element in determining whether an
individual is a sexual predator. 16 Although many argue that psychiatric
predictions of future dangerousness are too imprecise for civil commitment statutes, 17 the Supreme Court is likely to uphold the use of these
predictions. 18 Before permitting commitment, the MSPA requires a
mental health professional to find not only that the individual is likely
to engage in future sexually violent offenses, but that there is at least a
strong likelihood of that occurrence. 19 Using the adjective "strong"
implies a higher degree of belief, perhaps more than a fifty percent
probability, ensuring that only those offenders believed to be a legitimate
threat to commit new offenses are subject to involuntary confinement.
§ 3 .1. REFERRAL TO PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 20
( 1) When it appears that an individual may satisfy the definition of a
sexual predator under MSPA section 2(1 ), the agency with jurisdiction

16. MSPA § 2(l)(c).
17. See, e.g., Gleb, supra text note 6; La Fond, supra text note 19, at 770-71.
18. The Court has allowed dangerousness predictions in pretrial bail hearings,
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (upholding Bail Reform Act
authorization of pretrial detention on basis of future dangerousness); in capital offense
sentencing hearings, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 ( 1983); and implicitly in other sex
offender civil commitment schemes, Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (upholding
Illinois' Sexually Dangerous Persons Act). See also In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910
(Minn.) (upholding Minnesota's former Psychopathic Personality Commitment Act,
repealedand recodified by MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.0 1-.23 (West 1995)), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 146 (1994). The Court stated inFouchathat although psychiatry is an inexact
science,
such opinion is reliable enough to permit the courts to base civil commitments
on clear and convincing medical evidence that a person is mentally ill and
dangerous and to base release decisions on qualified testimony that the
[individual] is no longer mentally ill or dangerous. It is also reliable enough
for the State not to punish a person who by a preponderance of the evidence
is found to have been insane at the time he committed a criminal act, to say
nothing of not trying a person who is at the time found incompetent to
understand the proceedings.
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 76 n.3. Therefore, use of psychiatric predictions in the MSPA and
other civil commitment statutes should easily withstand attack.
19. See MSPA § 2(4).
20. This section is based on WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.025 (West Supp.
1995). See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.185(1) (West 1995).
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over the individual shall refer the case, in writing, to the prosecuting
attorney of the county where the individual was charged. When
practicable, referrals shall occur at least three months prior to:
(a) The anticipated release from confinement of a person previously
convicted of a sexually violent offense as either an adult or a juvenile;
(b) The release of a person who has been charged with a sexually
violent offense but has been found incompetent to stand trial; or
(c) The release of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity of
a sexually violent offense.
(2) As used in this section, "agency with jurisdiction" encompasses
any agency with the authority to direct the release of a person serving
a sentence or term of confinement and includes the departments of
corrections and social and health services.
§ 3.2. SEXUAL PREDATOR PETITION; FILING
(1) If it appears that an individual may be a sexual predator and good
cause exists for that belief, the prosecuting attorney for the county where
the individual was convicted or charged, or the attorney general if
requested by the prosecuting attorney, may file a petition with the court
alleging that the individual is a sexual predator and stating facts
sufficient to support that allegation, provided that:
(a) The term of confinement of a person previously convicted of a
sexually violent offense as either an adult or juvenile is about to expire
or has expired;
(b) A person who has been charged with a sexually violent offense,
but has been found incompetent to stand trial, is about to be or has been
released; or
(c) A person found not guilty by reason of insanity of a sexually
violent offense is about to be or has been released.
(2) A copy of the petition shall be served upon the individual, unless
the prosecuting attorney or attorney general shows just cause for an ex
parte judicial determination of probable cause.
COMMENTARY

Section 3.2 elaborates on Washington's petition filing system. 21
Most notably, the MSPA adds a provision requiring service of process. 22 Serving the petition on the individual, unless the prosecutor can
show a good reason for not doing so, gives the individual notice that the

21. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.030 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
22. Minnesota's commitment statute has a somewhat similar notice requirement.
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.07(4) (West 1995).
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State is seeking to take away his liberty. This allows the individual time
to take appropriate steps, such as retaining an attorney or disputing the
contents of the petition.
§ 3.3. PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION
Within forty-eight hours of filing the petition under MSPA section 3.2,
a judge shall determine in a hearing whether probable cause for the
charge exists. The alleged predator has the right to attend the hearing,
have counsel present, and challenge the prosecuting attorney's assertion,
unless the prosecuting attorney or attorney general has shown just cause
for an ex parte judicial determination. If the judge determines that
probable cause exists, the court shall issue an arrest warrant, when
necessary, and the individual shall be taken into custody for an initial
mental health examination.
COMMENTARY

After a petition is filed under the MSPA, the individual is permitted
a probable cause hearing within forty-eight hours and other significant
procedural protections. 23 Although the protections listed in section 3.3
may not be required by due process, 24 the stigma attached to commitment as a sexual predator and the seriousness of the charge mandate
reasonable procedural safeguards. From a morality and fairness
perspective, it is not unreasonable to allow a probable cause hearing
within forty-eight hours because similar hearings are common for
criminal charges. Likewise, permitting the alleged predator to appear in
court to refute the charges increases the chances of a fair hearing and
assures the individual the best opportunity to preserve his right to remain
free from confinement. The MSPA's procedures and protections are
aimed at providing reasonable, workable safeguards that protect the
charged individual without handcuffing the State. 25

23. MSPA § 3.3. Minnesota requires a hearing within 14 days, but the individual
may demand an immediate hearing. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.08(1) (West 1995).
Washington's statute simpl;y states that the judge shall determine whether probable cause
exists"[u]ponthe filingofa petition." WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 71.09.040 (West 1992
& Supp. 1995).
24. For a discussion of the appropriate procedural due process analysis, see supra
text accompanying notes 122-57.
25. See, e.g., MSPA §§ 3.3-4.2. After commitment, the sexual predator is afforded
additional rights, such as yearly mental health evaluations, individualized treatment plans,
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§ 3.4. INITIAL EXAMINATION26
When the court finds probable cause for a sexually violent predator
petition under MSPA section 3.3, the individual shall be taken into
custody and transferred to an appropriate facility, as determined by
social services, for a mental health evaluation as defined by MSPA
section 2(9) within forty-five days of the petition filing date. The
department shall then provide the court, the prosecuting attorney, and the
individual with its written recommendation of whether the individual
meets the statutory definition of a sexual predator under MSPA section
2(1).
§ 4.1. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 27
The alleged sexual predator has the following rights throughout the
proceedings:
(1) The right to be represented by legal counsel or have legal counsel
appointed if the individual cannot afford counsel;
(2) The right to retain qualified mental health practitioners to perform
examinations on the individual or have qualified mental health practitioners appointed if the individual cannot afford such assistance; the right
to reasonable access to all relevant medical and psychological records
and reports;
(3) The right to be present, with counsel, at any of the commitment
proceedings, unless good cause is shown for an ex parte hearing;
(4) The right to reasonable access to consult with counsel, to be
examined by qualified mental health professionals, and to prepare a
proper defense;
(5) The right to a trial within forty-five days after the filing of a
petition pursuant to MSPA section 3 .2; the right to a twelve-person jury,
to testify, to present witnesses on his or her behalf, and to a unanimous
verdict;
(6) The right to remain silent; and
(7) The right against self-incrimination.

and the keeping of personal belongings. See MSPA § 7.1-.2.
26. The influence for this section came from WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.040
(West 1992 & Supp. 1995). A 45-day deadline and service of the written recommendation to all parties was incorporated by this author.
27. The rights listed in MSPA § 4.1 originated principally from WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 275-155-050 (1994), as well as other civil commitment statutes.
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COMMENTARY

Section 4.1 (6) grants the individual the right to remain silent and
section 4.1(7) grants the individual the privilege against self-incrimination. Both the Washington Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court have held that the Constitution does not extend these
rights to sex offenders in civil proceedings. 28 However, the extension
of these rights does not truly hamper prosecutions, 29 though concededly, the determination of whether the person is a sexual predator would
be facilitated by the individual's cooperation and would perhaps even
benefit the individual. Allowing the alleged sexual predator these rights
will encourage the State to remain fair and evenhanded.
§ 4.2. RIGHTS OF PARTIES 30

(1) For good cause shown, the court may extend time for trial up to
an additional thirty days.
(2) Unless trial is commenced within forty-five days :from the petition
filing date, the petition .shall be automatically discharged and the
individual :freed :from the treatment facility, absent an extension of time
under subsections (1) or (3) of this section. Nothing in this subsection

28. See In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364
(1986). This commentator believes that if a jurisdiction extends these rights in other
civil commitment settings, it should do likewise for sexual predators. The Allen court
stated that the Fifth Amendment's rights are intended to curb improper extraction of
confessions, not to enhance reliability, and even ifit were intended to enhance reliability,
that it is "plausible ... that denying the evaluating psychiatrist the opportunity to
question persons alleged to be sexually dangerous would decrease the reliability of a
finding of sexual dangerousness." Allen, 478 U.S. at 374-75. However, as the dissent
pointed out, the Court overlooked the equal protection argument that because Illinois'
mentally ill were afforded the rights under the Fifth Amendment and sexually dangerous
persons are similarly situated to the mentally ill, they should also be granted the Fifth
Amendment rights. Id at 380-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
29. The prosecution can still use other sources to make its case, such as past mental
health evaluations, criminal history, school and juvenile records, and other witnesses.
For example, even though the Young majority claimed that "cooperation with the
diagnosis and treatment procedures is essential," Young refused to speak to the state's
psychologists and was still declared a sexual predator by a unanimous jury. Young, 857
P.2d at 995, 1013-14.
30. The majority of this section is attributed to MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.08(1)
(West 1995) and partially attributed to WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 71.09.050 (West 1992
& Supp. 1995).
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creates a right to freedom if the individual's confinement can be
continued on an alternative basis.
(3) On demand and for good cause shown, the court may extend time
for trial an additional ten days.
(4) The prosecuting attorney or attorney general, the judge, or the
individual has the right to demand that trial be held before a twelveperson jury. If no demand is made, the trial shall be before the court.
(5) The prosecuting attorney or attorney general may move to dismiss
the petition without prejudice at any time during the proceedings prior
to a final judgment being rendered.

§ 5.1. TRIAL 31
(1) The proceedings under this Act shall be civil in nature. However,
due to the individual's strong liberty interest and the stigma attached to
a sexual predator conviction, the individual is entitled to procedures
normally required in criminal proceedings, including the highest standard
of proof, rules of evidence, constitutional rights, and unanimity of
verdict. Before trial, the prosecuting attorney shall have the right to
have the petitioner examined by at least one expert or mental health
professional of his or her choice. At trial, the finder of fact shall
determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the individual is a sexual
predator, as defined in MSPA section 2. To reach that conclusion, the
court or jury must find that the individual's propensity to commit future
sexually violent offenses is causally linked to the individual's mental
illness.
(2) If the individual is found to be a sexual predator, the finder of fact
shall specify whether the sexual predator's mental illness is mild,
moderate, or severe and whether the likelihood that the predator will
engage in future sexually violent offenses is strong or very strong.
(3) In cases where the individual is found incompetent to stand trial
for a sexually violent offense, absent a prior judicial finding, the court
must determine whether the individual did commit the act in question
before considering whether the individual should be committed pursuant
to this Act. The hearing under this subsection shall have the same
substantive and procedural protections found in subsection ( 1), except for
the right not to be tried while incompetent.

31.

This section is based on a combination of WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 71.09.050-.060 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995) and ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 725, paras.

205/3.01, 4, 5 (1994).
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§ 5.2. COMMITMENT ALTERNATIVES GUIDELINES 32

The court shall determine the proper restriction on the individual's
freedom after the finder of fact has satisfied its duties under MSPA
sections 5.1(1)-(2). The court may choose from the following restrictions on freedom based upon the individual's prior convictions of
sexually violent offenses, the severity of the individual's mental illness,
and the likelihood of the individual's future dangerousness:
(1) Indefinite Commitment to Secure Facility. This subsection shall
apply to predators who have been found to have more than two
convictions of prohibited conduct listed under MSPA sections 2(2)(a)(c), a severe mental illness, and a very strong likelihood of engaging in
future sexually violent offenses against the public.
(2) Thirty-Six Month Commitment to Secure Facility. This subsection
shall apply to predators who have been found to have at least two
convictions of prohibited conduct listed under MSPA sections 2(2)(a)-(c)
or a combination of one conviction of prohibited conduct listed under
MSPA sections 2(2)(a)-(c) and at least two prior convictions of deviant
sexual conduct, a moderate or severe mental illness, and a very strong
likelihood of engaging in future sexually violent offenses.
(3) Eighteen Month Commitment to Secure Facility.
(a) This subsection shall apply to predators who have been found to
have at least one conviction of a sexually violent offense listed under
MSPA sections 2(2)(a)-(c) or more than two convictions of deviant
sexual conduct, a severe mental illness, and a strong or very strong
likelihood of engaging in future sexually violent offenses.
(b) This subsection shall also apply to predators who have been found
to have at least one conviction of a sexually violent offense listed under
MSPA sections 2(2)(a)-(c) or more than two convictions of deviant
sexual conduct, a mild or moderate mental illness, and a very strong
likelihood of engaging in future sexually violent offenses.
(4) Nine Month Commitment to Secure Facility. This subsection shall
apply to predators who have been found to have at least one conviction
of a sexually violent offense listed under MSPA sections 2(2)(a)-(c) or
more than two convictions of deviant sexual conduct, a mild or moderate

32. The guidelines proposed in this section were created by the author; they were
roughly inspired by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING CoMM'N,
GUIDELINES MANUAL (Nov. 1994).
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mental illness, and a strong likelihood of engaging in future sexually
violent offenses.
(5) Twenty-Four Month Commitment to Alternative Housing Facility.
This subsection shall apply to predators who have been found to have
at least one conviction of a sexually violent offense listed under MSPA
section 2, but no more than two convictions listed under MSPA sections
2(2)(a)-(c), if it appears to the court, after a favorable recommendation
by the secretary of social services and in light of the circumstances, that
the predator's admission to the alternative housing facility will not
expose the public to an unreasonable risk; a mild or moderate mental
illness; and a strong likelihood of engaging in future sexually violent
offenses. The court may order any additional restraints on the predator's
movements that the court deems necessary to better treat the predator or
protect the public.
(6) Twelve Month Commitment to Alternative Housing Facility. This
subsection shall apply to predators who have been found to have at least
one conviction of a sexually violent offense, but no more than two
convictions listed under MSPA sections 2(2)(a)-(c), or no more than one
conviction listed under MSPA sections 2(2)(a)-(c) with three convictions
of deviant sexual conduct, if it appears to the court, after a favorable
recommendation by the secretary of social services and in light of the
circumstances, that the predator's admission to the alternative housing
facility will not expose the public to an unreasonable risk; a mild or
moderate mental illness; and a strong likelihood of engaging in future
sexually violent offenses. Under this subsection, the court may order
any additional restraints on the predator's movements that the court
deems necessary to better treat the predator or protect the public.
(7) Less Restrictive Commitment Alternatives.
(a) This subsection shall apply to predators who have been found to
have at least one conviction of deviant sexual conduct as defined by
MSPA section 2(2)(d), but no more than four such convictions, if it
appears to the court, after a favorable recommendation by the secretary
of social services and in light of the circumstances, that the predator's
eligibility under this subsection will not expose the public to an
unreasonable risk; a mild mental illness; and a strong likelihood of
engaging in future sexually violent offenses. Predators convicted of
offenses under MSPA sections 2(2)(a)-(c) do not qualify for this
subsection unless the court, in its discretion, believes that application of
this subsection is appropriate under the circumstances.
(b) Under this subsection, the court has a duty to order the least
restrictive restraints on the predator's freedom in order to permit the
predator societal interaction while minimizing the possibility of harm to
the public. These restraints include, but are not limited to, house arrest,
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attaching a radio transmitter to the predator, daily check-ins with
probation officers, reduced periods at an alternative commitment facility,
curfews, and denials of access to certain areas, such as schools. Any
alternative or alternatives chosen by the court under this subsection must
be coupled with a comprehensive treatment plan and a definite term for
the alternative restriction. Under this subsection, courts are encouraged
to create alternative solutions to achieve the treatment and protection
goals of this Act. If the predator qualifies for the alternatives in this
subsection, but· the court is unsatisfied that the proposed alternative
restriction or restrictions would accomplish the Act's goals of treatment
and protection, after providing the parties with adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard on the matter, the court shall order the predator
committed under subsection (6) and state its reasons for so holding.
COMMENTARY

MSPA section 5 .2 is an innovative way to achieve the proper balance
between society's interest and the interests of the predator. The
guidelines established under the Act eliminate some of the most
pervasive problems associated with indefinite civil commitment schemes.
First, the guidelines provide the court with alternative levels of
restriction that correspond to the individual's degree of mental illness,
dangerousness, and prior offenses. Once the finder of fact has determined that the individual is a sexual predator, the guidelines ensure fair
sentencing of the predator based on objective criteria. Second, the
individual is properly confined at the level appropriate to his or her
personal background.
Under other commitment schemes, sexual
predators are simply committed indefinitely regardless of the individual's
actual dangerousness or the severity of his or her mental illness. The
MSPA allows for restrictions ranging from indefinite commitment (for
sexual predators with the highest propensities to offend again, combined
with severe mental illnesses and most harmful past sexual conduct)3 3
to the least restrictive alternatives possible (for sexual predators who are
the least likely to offend again, combined with mild mental illnesses and
past deviant sexual conduct). 34 Third, the guidelines help to minimize

33. MSPA § 5.2(1).
34. MSPA § 5.2(7). The MSPA also calls for intermediate restrictions where the
predator would be sent to a specialized housing facility that resembles a half-way house
or committed to a secure facility for an assigned period of time instead of indefinitely.
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the external political and societal pressures that could cause the court to
choose the maximum commitment for any sexual predator. The court
must use the specific findings from trial to choose the commitment term,
unless it would be in the best interests of the predator and the public to
deviate from the guidelines. 35 Lastly, the predator will likely recover
faster because he or she will receive the proper mixture of exposure to
society, confinement, care, and treatment.
§ 5 .3. HOUSING PREDATORS 36
Predators committed under sections 5.2(1)-(4) shall be housed in a
secure facility for control, care, and treatment until such time as the
individual's condition has so changed that he or she no longer satisfies
the requirements of MSPA section 2(1) or the period of commitment
expires without petition for renewal under MSPA section 5.5. Predators
committed under sections 5.2(5)-(6) shall be entered into an alternative
housing facility as defined under MSPA section 2(6) until such time as
the individual's condition has so changed that he or she no longer
satisfies the requirements of MSPA section 2(1) or the period of
alternative commitment expires without petition for renewal under
MSPA section 5.5. Predators committed under the provisions of section
5 .2(7) shall have their freedom restricted in such manner as determined
by the court until such time as the individual's condition has so changed
that he or she no longer satisfies the requirements of MSPA section 2(1)
or the period of the less restrictive commitment alternative expires
without petition for renewal under MSPA section 5.5.
§ 5.4. DEVIATION FROM COMMITMENT GUIDELINES 37
The Legislature has established a comprehensive commitment system
aimed at minimizing intrusion on the predator's liberty interests,
providing treatment, and maximizing societal protection. However,
when deviation from the guidelines established in MSPA section 5 .2
would be in the best interests of the predator and the public, and has
reasonable support in the facts, the court may enhance or reduce the
proposed restriction on the predator's freedom after providing the parties
with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard on the matter.

MSPA §§ 5.2(2)-(6).
35. See MSPA § 5.4 (stating that after adequate notice, the court may enhance or
reduce the commitment level provided there is reasonable support in the facts).
36. This section was influenced by many civil commitment statutes.
37. This section was created by the author.
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§ 5.5. PETITION FOR RENEWAL OF COMMITMENT PERIOD38
(1) Three weeks prior to the expiration of a period of commitment
under this Act, the prosecuting authority may file a petition with the
court for renewal of the predator's commitment. Failure to petition the
court for renewal before the expiration of the predator's commitment is
presumptive evidence that the individual is no longer a sexual predator
and the court shall order the individual released. After a renewal
petition is filed with the court, the rights of the parties under this section
are identical to those provided for in MSPA sections 4.1-.2 and 5.1(1),
except that for individuals committed for periods of one year or less, the
court shall determine if the individual is still a sexual predator; for
individuals committed for periods of more than one year, the individual
shall have the right to a jury trial. The prosecuting attorney has the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual still
suffers from a mental illness and poses a danger to commit future
sexually violent offenses against the public. If the finder of fact
determines that the individual is still a sexual predator, but with different
categories of mental illness or dangerousness than when last determined,
the court shall apply a new term of commitment pursuant to MSPA
sections 5.2 and 5.4. Otherwise, if the predator's categories of mental
illness and dangerousness remain the same as at the last determination
of the issue, the court shall renew the predator's prior term of commitment.
(2) The predator has the right to waive this hearing. A valid waiver
of the hearing constitutes a presumption that the individual is still a
sexual predator. The court shall renew the term of commitment, absent
facts that the predator's condition has worsened. In that case, the court
shall determine the predator's current degrees of mental illness and
dangerousness and commit the predator to the appropriate term under
MSPA sections 5.2 and 5.4.

38.
1995).

This section was principally influenced by MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.12 (West
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§ 6. PETITION FOR RELEASE FROM COMMITMENT39
(l)(a) If the secretary of social services determines that an individual's
condition has changed to the extent that he or she believes that the
individual is no longer a sexual predator as defined under section 2(1 ),
the secretary shall authorize the individual to petition the court for
release. The release petition shall be served upon the court and
prosecuting attorney and the court shall order a hearing on the matter
within thirty days of the filing date.
(b) If the prosecuting attorney does not respond to the predator's
release petition within twenty days of receipt, absent a valid extension
of time, the matter will be deemed presumptively conceded. The court
shall then adopt the secretary's findings as its own at the hearing, if
reasonable to do so, and release the individual from commitment. If the
circumstances warrant, the court may apply appropriate conditions to the
individual's release.
(c) If the prosecuting attorney contests the release petition, the court
shall set aside the hearing date and order a trial within thirty days. The
procedures for trial and commitment under this section are governed by
MSPA sections 4.1, 4.2(4) and 5.1-.4.
(2)(a) A predator may petition the court for release without the
secretary's authorization as a matter of right during the commitment,
provided the period of commitment is longer than one year. For
commitment periods of one year or less, the secretary's authorization is
required. Unless paragraph (c) applies, upon filing of the petition, the
court shall set a hearing date within thirty days and direct the secretary
to prepare a mental health evaluation of the individual, including reports
from mental health professionals with substantial knowledge of the
individual's present condition.
(b) The secretary's evaluation and any evaluations prepared on the
petitioner's behalf should be submitted to the court at least five days
prior to the hearing. At the hearing, the court shall determine if there
is probable cause for the predator's claim. If so, the prosecuting
attorney shall be given fourteen days to respond to the claim. Failure
to respond within the allotted time constitutes a presumption that the
individual is no longer a sexual predator and the court shall order the
individual released. After a response is filed with the court, trial shall
be commenced within thirty days. The trial procedures under this.
section are identical to those provided for in MSPA sections 4.1-.2 and

39. This section was created by incorporating portions ofILL. REV. STAT. ch. 725,
paras. 205/9, 10 (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 253B.18(5), (7)(West 1995); and WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.090-.100 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
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5.1(1), except that the finder of fact need only determine whether the
individual is a sexual predator.
( c) After denying a predator's initial petition for release during any
one term of commitment, the court shall scrutinize subsequent petitions
for sufficient grounds that lend support to the individual's claim that he
or she is no longer a sexual predator before ordering a hearing and a
new mental health evaluation. If sufficient grounds exist, the court shall
follow the procedures in paragraph 2(b ).
(3) For good cause shown, the court may extend time for trial or a
response to a release petition up to an additional thirty days. The court
may consolidate renewal and release petitions into one hearing or trial
when practicable. Nothing in this section creates a right to freedom if
the individual's confinement can be continued on alternative basis.
§ 7 .1 . RIGHTS OF COMMITTED PREDATORS40
All predators civilly committed to the secure or alternative housing
facilities and, where applicable, predators committed under less
restrictive commitment alternatives are entitled to:
(1) Mental health evaluations at least every twelve months or once per
term, whichever is more often;
(2) Individualized treatment plans as defined under MSPA section 7.2;
(3) Available and adequate treatment;
(4) Access, for purposes of evaluation, to all records and reports
related to the predator's commitment, control, care, and treatment;
(5) Wear their own personal clothes, keep personal possessions, and
furnish their living quarters, within reason;
(6) Reasonable freedom of movement within the facility;
(7) Have approved visitors within reasonable limitations;
(8) Reasonable access to receive and send correspondence and
telephone calls;
(9) Retain his or her own qualified mental health professionals in lieu
of the department's professionals and have reasonable access to these
prof1;Jssionals;
(10) Reasonable access to his or her attorney and to have an attorney
appointed if indigent;
(11) Be present at any court proceedings involving the predator;
40.
See

This section is principally derived from the Washington Administrative Code.
275-155-050 (1994).

WASH. ADMIN. CODE§

1295

(12) Receive notice of his or her right to petition the court for release
from the commitment;
(13) Petition the court for release from commitment;
(14) Opt to voluntarily waive the right to a hearing; and
(15) Opt to voluntarily waive his or her right to petition the court for
release.
§ 7.2. INDIVIDUALIZED TREATMENT PLAN 41
(I) When the court commits a person as a sexual predator, social
services staff must develop an individualized treatment plan ("ITP") for
that person. The ITP shall include, but is not limited to:
(a) A description of the predator's specific treatment needs;
(b) An outline of intermediate and long-range treatment goals;
(c) A projected timetable for reaching the treatment goals;
(d) The treatment strategies for achieving the treatment goals;
(e) A description of the social services staff's responsibilities; and
(f) Criteria for recommending to the court whether release, less
restrictive alternatives, or modification of the person's confinement
should be considered.
(2) The predator's ITP must be reviewed and updated at least every
six months.

41.

This section is derived from the Washington Administrative Code. See WASH.
§ 275-155-040 (1994).

ADMIN. CODE
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